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1. Introduction
The composition, characteristics, and role of the board of directors are central issues in 
corporate governance.  Ideal boards provide independent advising and monitoring of management 
appropriate to the needs of the firm.  These functions are especially important around strategic 
decisions, such as mergers, which have the potential to significantly impact firm value.  Moreover, 
mergers can alter a firm’s monitoring and advising needs and provide a convenient opportunity to 
improve or denigrate the existing board composition and structure.  Nevertheless, little empirical 
attention has been given to board changes, either around mergers or in general.   
We develop two competing hypotheses to examine the structure and composition of boards 
around mergers.  On the one hand, prior studies suggest reasons to expect that boards should 
remain fairly stable around mergers (stability hypothesis).  Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) posit 
that board structure is the result of negotiations between a CEO and its board.  Entrenched or 
powerful CEOs may exert pressure on a board (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004).  In this case, CEOs may try to limit board changes to maintain their influence even 
when a firm’s nature, and monitoring needs, warrant such changes.  In addition, transaction costs 
can impede boards from an optimal structure and/or composition (e.g., Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 
2008).  New directors added or incumbent directors leaving may alter board cohesion and impose 
personal costs on directors.  The limited empirical evidence supports this notion of relative board 
stability around mergers.  Harford (2003) finds that post-merger target director retention is rare. 
Alternatively, theoretical arguments suggest shifts in acquirer boards (change hypothesis).  
First, mergers represent a substantial shock to a firm that likely shifts its operational activities and 
increases firm complexity. Thus, a firm’s advising and monitoring needs change and imply 
appropriate adjustments to board structure and composition.  This firm need motive suggests that 
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board changes and director selection around mergers reflect the demand for increased advising and 
monitoring of the larger, more complex firm.  Second, a bargaining motive suggests that the post-
merger board is the outcome of negotiations between acquirers and targets based on relative 
bargaining power or to aid deal completion.  Third, changes around mergers may provide managers 
cover to add CEO-friendly directors and shift the power structure between the CEO and the board.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest that more powerful CEOs use their increased bargaining 
power over the director selection process to weaken board monitoring.  Under a CEO opportunism 
motive board changes around mergers occur for managerial welfare reasons. 
These alternative hypotheses (stability vs. change) lead us to explore several important and 
unaddressed questions: How stable are post-merger boards?  Which director characteristics are 
associated with selection on the post-merger board and are attributes demanded around a merger 
different than those in the absence of one?  How does post-merger director selection relate to the 
longevity of their tenure?  Finally, how important are firm need, bargaining, and CEO opportunism 
motives in decisions regarding the post-merger board’s structure and composition?   
Addressing these questions around mergers offers three main advantages.  First, mergers 
provide a unique setting to observe a relatively well-defined director labor pool and compare the 
characteristics of directors selected to those that are not.  Most prior studies are unable to observe 
candidates considered but not appointed to a board, leaving an incomplete picture of the director 
selection process.  Second, we can compare potential board changes around mergers to concurrent 
shifts in a firm’s nature, and test ideas consistent with advising and monitoring needs.  Third, 
mergers are a rich setting to explore potential conflicts of interest with management, acquirer and 
target boards and both firms’ shareholders, which may impact board structure and composition. 
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To address the stability of boards around mergers, we require a benchmark of typical board 
changes.  However, evidence on such a standard is limited.  Most prior studies examining board 
structure focus on cross-sectional variation, though a few examine changes over time, but for the 
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period.  Denis and Sarin (1999) report changes to board size and 
independence from 1983-1992, while Cicero, Wintoki, and Yang (2013) and Wintoki, Linck, and 
Netter (2012) examine these changes for two-year periods leading up to the implementation of 
SOX.  Thus, we first provide a benchmark of the time series variation of board structure in the 
modern era, which is important given the fundamental shift in boards around SOX and 
contemporaneous changes in exchange listing requirements (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2009). 
Examining our first question on board stability, we document substantial shifts in board 
size and composition around mergers from 1996-2012.  For the average deal, 0.95 target directors 
and 1.15 unaffiliated directors (directors neither on the target nor acquirer boards) are added to the 
post-merger board.  The selection of these unaffiliated directors suggests their importance given 
the pool of available target and acquirer directors likely considered but not appointed.  This 
addition of 2.1 directors around a merger is significantly greater than the 0.80 directors added in 
the absence of one.  We also document significant changes to existing personnel as roughly twice 
as many acquirer directors depart as in non-merging firms (1.40 versus 0.81, respectively).  Since 
firm size and complexity typically increase with a merger, we might expect board size to increase.  
Board size does increase 42% of the time, and yet in over half of these cases an acquirer director 
still departs.  Further, in nearly one-quarter of deals, acquirer boards shrink even though non-
acquirer directors are typically added.  These results are inconsistent with the stability hypothesis 
and suggest board structure and composition changes are significantly different around mergers.   
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Given evidence consistent with the change hypothesis, we assess firm need, bargaining, 
and CEO opportunism motives.  We first focus on specific director attributes demanded for a post-
merger board by comparing skills sought around a merger to those in a non-merger year.  Both 
unaffiliated and target director additions around mergers reflect an increased demand for specific 
skills, such as prior CEO, merger and board experience.  Non-merger director selection, however, 
occurs for more routine reasons such as diversity, financial expertise and retirement; director 
selection drivers are distinct in mergers.  These results hold comparing merger years to a propensity 
score-matched sample of non-merging firms or to post-merger size/industry matched non-merging 
firms (control for supply and demand factors of director selection).  To further understand the 
director labor market, we compare all acquirer and target directors’ attributes, selected or not, and 
unaffiliated directors added.  Directors selected post-merger represent an upgrade in talent from 
pre-merger (prior CEO, merger and industry experience).  Even if CEOs are likely entrenched, 
directors added do not have weaker monitoring abilities, inconsistent with CEO opportunism.  
Collectively, our results indicate firm need drives director selection around mergers.   
Next, we examine the motives for board structure and composition change around mergers 
at the firm-level.  As a target’s size and complexity increases, target directors with specific skills 
(e.g. CEO or merger experience) are more likely to be added post-merger.  This result is consistent 
with firm need and suggests that these firms require increased monitoring and advising.  Target 
representation on the post-merger board is also associated with lower target announcement returns, 
suggesting that target directors bargain bid premia for board seats.  Our results, however, provide 
no evidence in favor of acquirer agency conflicts as a motive for board changes around mergers.   
To provide additional evidence for our hypotheses, we examine the tenure of directors 
added to the post-merger board.  We expect that directors retained for a short period are more 
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likely to have been added for integration or bargaining purposes.  In comparison to target directors, 
unaffiliated directors are significantly more likely to be retained for periods longer than three years.  
Directors that remain long-term have more CEO-merger experience, financial expertise, and are 
more likely to be placed on key committees, consistent with firms keeping directors to fulfill 
longer-term firm needs.  In addition, the shorter tenure of target directors is concentrated in deals 
with more complex targets, consistent with the notion that they are temporarily retained to facilitate 
the post-merger integration process.  Collectively, our results provide evidence that firm need and 
bargaining motives play an important role in changes to acquirer boards around mergers. 
Our paper addresses the ongoing debate over the efficacy of board structure and its role as 
a governance mechanism. On the one hand, studies suggest that boards are optimally designed and 
provide appropriate oversight of the CEO and the firm.  Alternatively, director selection may be 
driven largely by CEOs seeking private benefits as well as other agency conflicts.  We find that 
the selection of board members is driven by the specific nature of the firm, rather than CEO 
opportunism. While we do find some evidence for director retention that is consistent with 
bargaining, the directors selected appear of better quality.  Overall, the drivers of director selection 
are different around mergers and are consistent with a firm’s monitoring and advising needs. 
2. Hypotheses 
The impact of mergers on the structure and composition of acquirer boards is an empirical 
issue previously undocumented in the literature.  We develop two competing hypotheses related 
to the structure of the post-merger board:  relative stability versus change.  
2.1 Motivations for Board Stability around Mergers 
There are several reasons why post-merger boards may remain stable (stability hypothesis).  
First, as targets are relatively smaller, the incumbent board may be adequate to monitor and advise 
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the post-merger firm.  Second, theory suggests board structure is the result of negotiations between 
CEOs and a board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).  Coles et al. (2014) and Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) find that entrenched or powerful CEOs can wield significant influence.  Even if a firm’s 
nature and monitoring require alterations, powerful CEOs may curb board changes that would 
diminish their influence.1   
Transaction costs can also impede boards from their optimal structure and/or composition.  
Coles et al. (2008) note that CEOs can face personal costs if incumbent directors with professional/ 
personal relations to a CEO leave or if new directors are added without such relations.  Research 
also indicates that few target directors are included post-merger.  Harford (2003) documents that 
in over half of mergers, no target directors are retained and when a target director is retained, on 
average only one is selected.  These arguments imply stability of the post-merger board. 
To test board stability, we compare pre-merger acquirer and target boards to post-merger 
boards.  Structural shifts are reflected in changes to board size while adjustments to board 
composition are captured by both additions and departures.  We also compare variations in boards 
around mergers to years in which the same firm does not merge and to a propensity score-matched 
sample of non-merging firms based on pre-merger firm and board characteristics.   
2.2 Motivations for Board Changes around Mergers 
Alternatively, there is theoretical and empirical evidence in other contexts suggesting board 
structure and composition could change post-merger (change hypothesis).  We propose three non-
mutually exclusive motivations for such change: firm need, bargaining, and agency.   
 
 
                                                          
1 Alternatively, an entrenched CEO may not only protect her position, but may seek to opportunistically alter the board 
in her favor.  We consider this alternate interpretation of agency motives in Section 2.2.3. 
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2.2.1 Firm Need 
Mergers can represent a substantial shock to a firm, requiring board changes in response to 
shifts in underlying firm fundamentals.  As mergers expand a firm into new product lines, 
additional geographic areas, and increase its size and/or complexity, its monitoring and advising 
needs could change as well.  Acquisitions can also represent a convenient opportunity to upgrade 
the set of existing board skills since personnel changes can be easier to explain.   
The firm need motive suggests post-merger board changes are consistent with evolving 
monitoring and advising needs.  Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that a firm’s organization 
depends on the operational complexity, with more complex firms requiring larger and more 
hierarchical organizations.  Harris and Raviv (2008) and Raheja (2005) hypothesize and Boone et 
al. (2007), Coles et al. (2008), and Linck et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence in the cross-
section that more complex firms have larger, more independent boards; implying a positive 
association between complexity and board changes around mergers. We employ several measures 
of complexity, including relative deal size, industry diversification, number of target business 
segments, and R&D expenditures (Boone et al., 2007, Coles et al., 2008, and Linck et al., 2008).   
In addition to testing firm need at the firm-level, we examine characteristics of directors 
selected versus not selected post-merger.  Prior work identifies characteristics valued in the 
director labor market: CEO experience (Fich, 2005 and Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz, 2010), 
diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), financial expertise (Guner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008), 
higher education (Cashman, Gillan, and Whitby, 2012), industry expertise (Denis, Denis and 
Walker, 2015), merger experience (Harford and Schonlau, 2013), outside directorships (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), and performance (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2013).  As a firm’s 
monitoring and advising needs increase, these director skills become more valuable.  Under the 
8 
 
firm need motivation, directors added around mergers should possess more of these attributes than 
directors added in the absence of a deal.  In addition, this motive predicts that directors selected 
for the post-merger board will have more of these qualities than directors not selected. 
Firms assess skills needed in an ever-changing environment.2  Existing directors can also 
face retirement or mandatory age limitations.  Thus, firm need suggests that boards seek desirable 
attributes not currently present or that need to be replaced.  Many firms use a two-dimensional 
matrix showing needs versus existing attributes to determine if candidates possess skills absent.  
For example, while financial expertise may be valuable, it may already exist.  In this case, a board 
would be less likely to seek more financial talent at the expense of other characteristics.  The 
proprietary information on specific board needs is unobservable, but will be reflected in the skills 
of directors added.  The characteristics of directors chosen exhibit a board’s revealed preference. 
2.2.2 Bargaining 
A second reason acquirers may alter boards around mergers is related to negotiations.  The 
price paid to target shareholders, location of the headquarters, name of the post-merger firm, and 
identity of the post-merger CEO and chair are all bargaining items.  The bargaining motive 
suggests that the structure and composition of the post-merger board is an outcome of negotiations 
between acquirers and targets.3  In this case, the addition of target directors post-merger is related 
to the negotiated deal terms and/or the bargaining position of the parties involved in the transaction.  
Prior studies focus on the potential conflict of interest faced by target management in the 
negotiation process.  Wulf (2004) finds that target CEOs trade post-merger retention for premium 
at the expense of target shareholders.  Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) show that target CEOs 
                                                          
2 Recent examples include boards seeking directors familiar with modern social media.  The 2011 Spencer Stuart 
Board Index indicates that demand for directors with digital backgrounds increased over 20% in the prior year.   
3 As one example, 21st Century Fox offered shareholders of Time Warner, Inc. board representation as part of Fox’s 
bid to acquire Time Warner (Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2014). 
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are able to negotiate retention in exchange for lower merger bonuses related to the deal.  The 
bargaining power of the parties involved may also be related to the post-merger board structure.  
Acquirers with a stronger bargaining position might not need to offer board seats as a concession 
in order to ensure deal completion.  On the other hand, targets with more bargaining power may 
be better able to negotiate for post-merger seats without trading off other deal terms.   
 To test this bargaining, we examine the relation between the addition of target directors, 
measures of relative bargaining power and deal premium.  We use four proxies for the relative 
bargaining power between the acquirer and target: relative deal size, target prior performance, 
target poison pill (Comment and Schwert, 1995) and target classified board (Bates, Becher, and 
Lemmon, 2008).  Larger targets and those with higher prior performance, a poison pill or classified 
board likely hold more bargaining power. Deal premium, proxied by a target’s announcement 
returns, can be traded for seats on the post-merger board.  The bargaining motive predicts a positive 
relation between target director on the post-merger board and target bargaining power, but a 
negative one for target announcement returns.  This motivation, however, does not provide specific 
predictions about characteristics of target directors selected to the post-merger board; thus we are 
agnostic with regard to predictions for this rationale at the individual director level.  
2.2.3 CEO Opportunism 
 A final reason for post-merger board changes also relates to entrenchment issues.  CEO 
opportunism suggests that board changes occur for acquirer managerial welfare reasons.  Mergers 
can provide a convenient opportunity for acquirer CEOs to shift to a more management friendly 
board.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model board structure as a negotiation between a CEO and 
outside directors. More powerful CEOs may use their bargaining power to weaken board 
monitoring under the guise of structural shifts related to a deal.  Fracassi and Tate (2012) provide 
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evidence consistent with this as firms with more influential CEOs are more likely to appoint 
directors connected to a CEO, which reduces firm value and leads to weaker board monitoring.  
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that CEOs involved in the director selection process are more 
likely to appoint busy directors, which could be consistent with the appointment of less valuable 
monitors.  The absence of constraints on a CEO’s power may also affect the post-merger board.  
Boone et al. (2007) observe a positive relation between board independence and constraints on 
CEO influence, including monitoring by institutional owners.  This prior evidence implies an 
association between director selection, a CEO’s power and the existence of external monitoring.    
CEO opportunism predicts a positive association between acquirer CEO power and board 
changes, but a negative one between powerful CEOs and measures of individual director 
monitoring quality.  Both of these relations would be moderated by constraints on CEO power, 
such as the existence of external monitors.  Proxies for CEO power include the percentage of board 
capture, CEO-Chair duality, classified board, CEO ownership, and business connections between 
a CEO and directors (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2014; Fracassi and Tate, 2012).  External 
monitoring is proxied by the percentage of shares held by the top 5 institutional owners. 
3. Data 
3.1 Main Sample  
 To test our hypotheses, we construct three samples: primary acquirer sample, propensity 
score-matched sample of non-merging firms based on pre-merger firm characteristics and a post-
merger firm size, Fama-French 12 industry-matched sample of non-merging firms. Our primary 
acquirer sample consists of deals between 1996 and 2012 from the Thompson/SDC U.S. Merger 
and Acquisitions database (SDC).  To observe acquirer and target directors, we require that both 
firms are U.S. publicly traded, the merger completed and 100 percent of a target is acquired.  From 
SDC, we collect announcement and completion dates, transaction value, method of payment, and 
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merger premium.  This sample is merged with Compustat for accounting data, Center for Research 
of Stock Prices (CRSP) for stock returns, and institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters.  
Data on directors 1996 to 2003 (2004 to 2012) are obtained from RiskMetrics (BoardEx).4  
We require information on acquirer and target pre-merger boards from the board report date closest 
to but prior to the announcement and on the post-merger board from the board report date closest 
to but after completion.  BoardEx provides details on director education, certifications, as well as 
past and current employment and directorships.  For directors with missing information, we hand-
collect data from proxy statements.  Our final sample consists of 716 acquirers in 1,153 mergers.   
To identify changes to acquirer boards, post-merger directors are matched with pre-merger 
acquirer and target directors. We define three types of post-merger directors: (i) retained directors 
from the pre-merger acquirer board (10,688); (ii) retained directors from the pre-merger target 
board (1,089); and (iii) unaffiliated directors on neither the acquirer nor target board pre-deal 
(1,459).  We also define two other types of directors: not retained acquirer (target) directors on the 
pre-merger acquirer (target) board, but not on the post-merger board (1,895(9,199)).     
3.2 Non-Merger Year Samples 
To understand board structure and composition changes around a merger, it is necessary to 
have a benchmark of typical board changes in non-merger situations.  Surprisingly, the availability 
of such a benchmark is limited.5  As a result, we create three distinct non-merger year samples: 
own-firm non-merger sample, propensity score-matched sample, and supply-side matched sample.   
  
                                                          
4 The BoardEx universe begins in 2000, but since Management Diagnostics began data collection in 2003, firms that 
were publicly traded between 2000 and 2003, but delisted before 2004 are not part of the BoardEx universe.   
5 Denis and Sarin (1999) examine changes to board size and independence (1983-1992).  Cicero, Wintoki, and Yang 
(2013) and Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) present changes in board size and independence over two-year periods 
pre-Sarbanes Oxley.  These studies focus on changes in the fraction of outside directors and the number of directors.   
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3.2.1 Own-Firm Non-Merger Sample  
First, we create a sample of firm-years in which the acquirers in our sample did not engage 
in a merger.  Board changes in this non-merger years sample are identified the same as the merger 
sample detailed above.  Retained directors sat on the board in the prior year and continue to do so.  
New directors did not sit on the board in the prior year.  Not retained directors sat on the board in 
the prior year, but no longer do so.  This own-firm non-merger sample includes 6,659 firm-years. 
3.2.2 Propensity Score-Matched Sample 
Comparing changes in board structure around a merger to those in non-merger years allows 
us to compare a firm to itself.  This methodology, however, may not account for the fact that the 
changes are driven by underlying factors rather than a merger, such as time trends or other industry 
factors.  As a result, we employ a difference-in-difference methodology where we construct a 
second benchmark of non-merger board changes by matching the pre-merger firm to firms that 
did not merge.  Firms are matched using a propensity score-matching methodology based on firm 
and board characteristics.  Each acquirer is matched to ten non-merger firms with replacement 
with the closest propensity scores based on the model in Appendix B.6  We calculate differences 
in board changes across time (e.g., pre- versus post-merger) and matched firms.  The difference of 
these differences (difference-in-difference) allows us to compare two sets of relatively similar 
firms in the same year, where the main difference is one undergoes a merger and the other does 
not.  This sample yields 6,346 matched non-merger firm-years to compare to our main sample.  
3.2.3 Supply-side Matched Sample  
The characteristics of directors selected for the post-merger board reveals a firm’s demand 
for particular skills and attributes.  It is possible, however, that director selection is not purely a 
                                                          
6 All results are robust to a non-merger matched sample based on the five nearest neighbors or a caliper of 0.001. 
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demand effect.  For a given director to be added, they must also agree to serve.  The post-merger 
firm is larger and presumably more prestigious, making a seat on that board more attractive 
(Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).  To control for these supply-side effects, our third benchmark focuses 
on the post-merger firm.  We create another matched sample of firms that did not engage in a 
merger in the same year.  This sample is based on the post-merger firm size and industry and yields 
44,833 matched non-merger firm-years to compare to our merger sample.  These matched firms 
are likely attracting potential candidates from the same pool of individuals as the acquirers.   
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 details summary statistics for the primary sample of 1,153 acquisitions from 1996-
2012.  Panel A presents deal characteristics, which are consistent with studies using similar sample 
restrictions (e.g., Cai and Sevilir, 2012, and Ishii and Xuan, 2014).  Panel A focuses on measures 
of firm complexity to test for firm need.  Average (median) relative deal size is 0.46 (0.22), 
suggesting a wide range of deal complexity within our sample.  Panel B details that, on average, 
acquirer size and number of business segments increase after a merger.  In addition, the average 
target spends a significantly higher percentage of assets on R&D than the average acquirer.    
Following prior studies, the number of outside directorships, education level, financial 
expertise, as well as CEO, merger, and industry experiences are proxies for director talent and 
quality (Panel C).  Compared to acquirer boards, target boards are smaller, and their directors hold 
fewer outside directorships, are less educated, and have less prior merger/CEO-merger experience.  
Target boards, however, have more financial experts and outside CEO experience than acquirers. 
We conduct individual director-level analyses, with pair-wise comparisons (e.g., target directors 
retained to acquirer directors leaving) to test the firm need and CEO opportunism motives.  
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To test for bargaining, we use four proxies for the target’s relative bargaining power: 
relative deal size, target prior performance, target poison pill and target classified board.  Panel B 
of Table 1 shows that average annual prior target stock performance is 9.5% compared to 16.8% 
for acquirers.  Roughly 40% of targets have a poison pill and 60% have a classified board.  In 
addition, a target’s abnormal merger announcement return is used as a proxy for a negotiating term 
that can be traded for seats on the post-merger board under the bargaining motive.  Panel A of 
Table 1 reports that target shareholders experience an average announcement return of 25.1%. 
Measures of acquirer CEO power and external monitoring are used to test for CEO 
opportunism.  Proxies for CEO power include the degree of board capture, CEO-Chair duality, 
CEO ownership, and business connections between a CEO and directors.  Panel C details that 55% 
of the pre-merger acquirer board is captured, significantly higher than for targets (51%).  Two-
thirds of acquirer CEOs are chair, higher than for the target (59%) and average acquirer CEO 
ownership is 2.4%.  Finally, the percentage of acquirer directors that currently or previously served 
on the same board or worked at the same firm as the acquirer CEO (connected to CEO) is 10%, 
but only 0.8% of target directors have these connections.  External monitoring is proxied by the 
percentage of shares held by the top 5 institutional owners and this percentage of shares held by 
these owners is higher for targets than acquirers and increases for the combined firm (Panel B).  
4. Results 
4.1 Board Dynamics around Mergers 
Our first research question focuses on whether there are changes to acquirer boards around 
mergers and if these changes are different from changes in the absence of a merger.  Table 2 
provides a univariate difference-in-difference analysis, where we compare changes to acquiring 
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boards to changes of our benchmark firms.7  For each of our board structure measures, we calculate 
the difference in both the pre- and post-period across merger and matched firms and then calculate 
the difference in these differences.  Panel A examines difference-in-differences for various 
measures of board changes across all firms, while Panel B segments results by relative deal size.   
Panel A reports that in the pre-merger period differences in board structure and 
composition changes between acquiring firms and the propensity score-matched non-acquiring 
firms is insignificant.  After a merger, however, there are substantial and significant differences in 
board changes for merging firms.  Nearly 10% of the post-merger board consists of newly added 
unaffiliated directors versus 7.9% for non-merger matched firms.  Similarly, at least one 
unaffiliated director is added in 58% of merger years versus 51% for non-merger firms (both are 
significantly higher around mergers).  This corresponds to an addition of 1.15 unaffiliated directors 
in merger years compared to only 0.80 directors in non-merger years.  In unreported results, we 
also find that retained target directors represent 7.1% of the post-merger board or 0.95 additional 
directors added to the post-merger board (implying 10% of the target board is retained).8   
Significant board changes, however, are not limited to adding directors.  A greater fraction 
of a prior year’s directors depart in merger years (12.8%) than at non-merging firms (7.9%).  This 
corresponds to at least one director departing in 65% (51%) of the years with (without) a merger.  
The difference-in-differences of director additions and departures from pre- to post-merger periods 
are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  This suggest that changes to acquiring firm boards 
are significantly greater relative to non-acquiring matched firms in the year following a merger.   
New directors added and incumbent directors departing does not fully reflect board 
changes in mergers.  Board size increases nearly twice as frequently around mergers, yet over 50% 
                                                          
7 We find similar results comparing board changes around a merger to our own-firm non-merger sample (unreported).   
8 Harford (2003) finds a similar percentage of target director retention post-merger.  
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(33%) of the time an acquirer director also departs at merging (non-merging) firms; difference-in-
differences are significant at the 1% level.  Acquirer board size is significantly less likely to remain 
stable following a merger compared to the matched sample of non-acquiring firms (36% in merger 
versus 50% in non-merger years).  While firm size and complexity increase in mergers, board size 
decreases 22% of the time, despite the addition of new directors in nearly half of these cases.  
Overall, the composition and/or size of the board changes nearly 84% (68%) of the time around 
mergers compared to the absence of one, highlighting the dynamics of board variation in mergers.  
While we document considerable board variation around mergers, these changes could be 
primarily driven by the nature and complexity of a deal.  To test this, we split our mergers into 
terciles by relative deal size (Panel B).  Regardless of size, acquirer boards are less stable in merger 
than non-merger years.  In particular, additions and departures to acquirer boards vary by deal size, 
yet the difference-in-differences are substantial even in the smallest deals.   
The univariate difference-in-difference tests in Table 2 yield evidence consistent with 
substantial changes to acquirer boards around mergers.  We verify whether these results hold in a 
multivariate framework in Table 3.  To capture the impact of mergers on boards, we create two 
indicators; one for acquirers (Merger) and one the post-merger period (Post).  We regress measures 
of board structure and composition changes on these indicators and their interaction (Merger x 
Post).  If acquiring boards experience more change than the non-merging matched sample, the 
coefficient on the interaction term should be positive and significant.  We also control for firm and 
board characteristics as well as industry and year fixed effects. The board structure and 
composition changes of interest include change in board size (Models 1 and 4), the addition of 
unaffiliated directors (Models 2 and 5) and the departure of incumbent directors (Models 3 and 6).   
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Model 1 of Table 3 reports that the coefficient on Merger x Post is 0.562 and is significant 
at the 1% level.  This result suggests that, following a merger, the board size of acquiring firms 
increases significantly compared to the non-merger matched sample.  We find similar results in 
regard to the addition of unaffiliated directors (Model 2) and the departure of incumbent directors 
(Model 3). These results imply an increase in the relative addition/departure of unaffiliated/ 
incumbent directors following a merger.  The economic magnitude of the relative board changes 
following a merger is similar to those reported in the univariate analysis.  Our results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged in Models 4-6 where we include all control variables 
providing additional evidence that acquiring firm boards are not stable around mergers.   
Despite our difference-in-difference analysis, other explanations may exist for board 
changes around mergers.  First, these changes may be driven by anticipation of a deal or as a firm 
re-evaluates its needs post-merger.  We examine shifts in boards in the years prior to and after a 
merger (Figure 1) and find little evidence of significant board changes.  For example, the average 
percentage of new directors in the year prior to (after) a merger is 9.8% (7.7%) compared to 18.7% 
in a merger year.9  Next, given board classification as a potential entrenchment device, firms with 
classified boards may experience fewer changes. In unreported tests we find no evidence firms 
with classified boards experience any less board changes around mergers. 
It is also possible that the emergence of activist investors plays a role in a firm undertaking 
a merger and the concurrent changes in board structure and composition.   Prior studies document 
that these investors do seek board representation (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, 2008 and 
Klein and Zur, 2009).  In unreported results, we search for all cases where an acquirer is the subject 
of a 13-D filing or amendments in the two years pre-merger announcement.  Reviewing each filing, 
                                                          
9 We obtain qualitatively similar results if we extend the window to three years before/after the merger is completed. 
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we find that 5.5% of our mergers experience the emergence of an activist investor in this two-year 
window.10  For these few cases where an activist emerges, we examine all related 13D filings and 
Factiva news stories to determine if the activist attempted to influence the board or the merger.   In 
only 0.6% of our deals did an outside investor publicly encourage the merger or attempt to obtain 
representation on the acquirer board.  We also exclude all deals in which an activist appears in this 
two-year window and find qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Collectively, these 
results suggest that the influence of activists is not a first-order concern in our study.  
Finally, some unobservable endogenous factor not captured by the propensity score-
matching methodology may drive the motivation to undertake a merger and subsequent board 
changes.  One setting where the motivation to merge may be more exogenous is an industry merger 
wave, which may be spurred by technological or regulatory shocks (Harford, 2005).  During such 
a wave, acquirers may be forced to merge.  Examining deals that take place inside a wave, we 
continue to find significant board changes around mergers (untabulated).  Overall, we do not find 
support that these alternative motivations explain board changes around mergers. 
Overall, results in Tables 2 and 3 as well as Figure 1 are striking: acquiring boards are not 
stable around mergers.  These findings suggest substantial shifts in board structure and 
composition surrounding mergers and these changes are significantly greater than those that 
otherwise occur.  We next turn our attention to understand why these changes occur. 
4.2 What Does the Director Labor Market Value? 
By focusing on adjustments to the post-merger board at the individual director level, our 
goal is to better understand the specific skills of board members valued in the director labor market.  
                                                          
10 An activist investor may have already filed a 13D prior to our two-year window before the merger (existing activist).  
Less than 1% of acquirers had an existing activist file an amendment during this window. Further, on average, these 
existing activists hold a position in the acquirer for more than five years before the merger. 
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The setting of mergers affords the opportunity to compare directors selected to a post-merger board 
to those not selected.  The revealed preference of firms’ post-merger selections provides evidence 
on why board structure and composition change around mergers.   We begin by exploring whether 
the attributes demanded in a merger year are different from those sought in a non-merger year.     
4.2.1 Merger vs. Non-merger Years 
For each acquirer in our main merger sample, Panel A of Table 4 compares attributes of 
directors added to the board in merger years to the set of firms in the propensity score-matched 
sample that did not engage in a merger.11  Comparison (1) focuses on all new directors on a board 
(unaffiliated and retained targets in merger years versus new in non-merger years).  Comparisons 
(2) and (3) examine only unaffiliated and only retained target directors, respectively, added in 
merger years versus new directors in non-merger years. 
In general, comparison (1) suggests that firms select directors in merger years for different 
reasons than in non-merger years as all attributes of directors added in merger years are statistically 
different from those selected in non-merger years.  In particular, directors in merger years are 
added for their deal and executive experience (external CEO, merger, CEO-merger, and industry 
experience); a skill set likely related to the monitoring and advising needs of merger integration.  
Conversely, director selection in non-merger years focuses on retirement (age), general skills 
(higher education and financial expertise) and diversity (gender).12  These results are consistent 
with firm need; as the monitoring and advising needs of a firm change with a merger, certain 
director skills (e.g. deal and industry experience) become more valuable. 
                                                          
11 In unreported analysis, we also compare the attributes of directors added around a merger to directors added at the 
same acquiring firms in non-merger years and find quantitatively and qualitatively similar results.   
12 Results are robust to restricting merger experience to recent experience in the past three years (rather than at any 
point in the past) as well as restricting financial expertise to only CFA/CPA certification in this and all further analysis.  
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Comparisons (2) and (3) of Panel A separate new directors in merger years into unaffiliated 
and target directors, respectively.  Again, we find that unaffiliated and retained target directors 
possess more executive and deal experience than new directors added in non-merger years.  Both 
unaffiliated and target directors added have significantly more CEO and CEO-merger experience 
than new directors selected at non-merger matched firms.  In addition, retained target directors 
possess more outside directorships and merger experience than non-merger year additions.  
Panel B of Table 4 addresses potential supply-side effects related to the composition of the 
post-merger board.  As firm size increases, seats on the post-merger board may be more prestigious 
in the director labor market and thus, attract more qualified directors than the pre-merger board.  
We address this concern by matching each acquirer to a set of non-acquirers in the same year, 
Fama-French 12 industry and firm size decile based on the size of the post-merger firm.  This 
matched sample of new directors added in non-merger years allows us to compare unaffiliated 
directors added to acquirer boards to a comparable pool of new directors that may have been 
considered but not selected by an acquirer.  In general, results are consistent with Panel A.   
Overall, directors added in merger years are selected for their executive and deal experience.  
These results provide further support for firm need; changes in acquiring boards around mergers 
reflect attributes related to a firm’s changing monitoring and advising needs. 
4.2.2 Director Selection - Acquirer and Target Director Pools 
Next, we examine determinants of post-merger board selection for acquirer and target pools 
of directors using logistic regressions in Table 5.  These models include deal fixed effects which 
allow within deal variation in director characteristics for each pool to explain selection.  The deal 
fixed effects control for any unobservable firm or deal-specific attributes that may simultaneously 
link engaging in a merger and changes to a board.  Column 1 examines selection from the 
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combined acquirer and target director pool.13  Consistent with firm need, acquirer and target 
directors on a post-merger board have more outside directorships.  Notwithstanding the literature 
on busy boards, experience on additional boards broadens the experience brought to the current 
board.  In addition, selected directors possess more prior merger experience than those not selected, 
also consistent with firm need.  Finally, directors with outside target industry experience are less 
likely to be added.  While this appears inconsistent with firm need, it is concentrated in related 
deals and suggests a duplicative effect as acquirer and target directors have similar industry 
knowledge.  Consistent with firm need, if we limit the sample to diversifying deals, the coefficient 
on target industry experience becomes positive and significant for target directors (untabulated).  
To further address supply side issues in the director labor market, we construct measures 
of the relative importance of a directorship (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).  A director’s board seat 
with the highest (lowest) market capitalization is ranked as the most (least) important directorship.  
Directors with only one seat are ranked as the most important.  Directors are more likely to appear 
on the post-merger board if that directorship (acquirer or target) is their most important.   
Having examined characteristics of all directors retained post-merger, we next condition 
on deals in which at least one target director is added and focus on the target director pool (Column 
2).  Target directors with more outside directorships and more outside CEO experience are more 
likely to be added to the post-merger board (all consistent with firm need), although female target 
directors are less likely added.  While our results indicate diversity in gender is valued, there may 
be a limit to which adding any specific attribute is valuable, especially if other desirable qualities 
(e.g., CEO experience) are demanded.  Focusing on supply-side effects, target directors are less 
likely added if the target directorship is the director’s least important seat.  These results provide 
                                                          
13 This model includes all acquirer and target directors, even if no target director is on the post-merger board.   
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support for the firm need motive; when target directors are added to the post-merger board, they 
possess more outside executive and board experience than target directors not retained. 
Finally, we separate the acquirer pool and condition on deals when at least one acquirer 
director departs (Column 3).  Consistent with firm need, acquirer directors on the post-merger 
board hold more outside directorships and merger experience than those that depart.  In addition, 
acquirer directors retained have less outside target industry experience, again concentrated in 
related deals.  Acquirer directors with outside CEO experience are less likely retained, which 
appears inconsistent with firm need.  However, in subsequent tests, the net amount of outside CEO 
experience on the post-merger board increases with the addition of unaffiliated directors.  
Inconsistent with the agency motives, CEO connections do not explain post-merger retention.     
As an additional test of CEO opportunism, we estimate regressions similar to Table 5 for 
subsamples based on potential agency conflicts and find the characteristics of retained acquirer 
and target directors are not different for CEO-Chair duality, acquirers with captured boards 
(highest tercile of percentage captured), high CEO ownership (highest tercile of CEO ownership), 
low institutional ownership (lowest tercile of institutional ownership), or connections between 
directors and the acquirer CEO (highest tercile of percent connected).  These results are not 
consistent with CEO opportunism.  Overall, results suggest that boards change around mergers to 
increase experience; director backgrounds with executive and deal experience are most valued. 
4.2.3 Director Selection – Unaffiliated and Retained Target Directors  
To further understand the post-merger board at the director-level, Table 6 compares 
unaffiliated directors added to other (not) retained directors. We estimate logistics including deal 
fixed effects as in Table 5.  Consistent with firm need, unaffiliated directors are added for their 
CEO, outside directorship, and target industry experience.  In fact, these directors have more of 
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this experience than retained and not retained acquirer directors.  Unaffiliated directors are also 
more likely to be connected to an acquirer CEO than target directors (retained or not), but, not 
surprisingly, less so than acquirer directors retained.  This finding could be indicative of either 
agency conflicts or a desire to populate a board with directors of known quality, given that there 
are both costs and benefits associated with the appointment of connected directors (Schmidt, 
2015).  We address these interpretations in subsequent tests.  Unaffiliated directors added do have 
significantly less merger experience than retained or departing acquirer or target directors.  In 
general, however, our results provide support for firm need; the addition of unaffiliated directors 
upgrades the director skill set of the post-merger board that could be useful in merger integration.   
Table 6 also examines retained target directors and builds on our evidence that boards 
upgrade talent around mergers.  Consistent with unaffiliated directors, retained target directors 
hold more directorships and have more outside CEO experience than (not) retained acquirer 
directors.  In addition, these directors have more target industry experience than acquirer directors, 
providing additional support for firm need as a motive for director selection.   
We also examine if managerial welfare motives explain the addition of unaffiliated or 
retained target directors.  We estimate regressions similar to Table 6 for subsamples based on our 
measures of acquirer CEO power (untabulated).  The characteristics of unaffiliated and retained 
target directors compared to all other sets of directors do not vary by these measures.  Regardless 
of potential CEO opportunism, directors added around a merger possess more outside CEO 
experience and outside directorships than retained and not retained acquirer (target) directors.  
These results provide additional evidence in favor of firm need rather than agency motives.   
Overall, results from Tables 4-6 examining the determinants of director selection provide 
broad evidence that past experience matters for director selection onto the post-merger board.  In 
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particular, directors with outside CEO, merger, and additional industry experience as well as those 
with more outside directorships are more likely included on the post-merger board.  Our findings 
suggest that firm need drives director selection and improves overall board quality around mergers. 
4.3 What Determines Board Changes around Mergers? 
 Next, we focus on firm-level tests to examine motivation for board changes.  Table 7 
examines the percentage of: target directors added (Model 1), unaffiliated directors added (Model 
2), and acquiring board not retained (Model 3).  In Model 1, the percentage of target directors on 
the post-merger board increases with relatively larger deals and more complex (high R&D) targets.  
Consistent with firm need, as target complexity or size increases, so do the monitoring and advising 
skills needed.  Merging with a target outside an acquirer’s industry may imply a greater need for 
advising skills, suggesting higher target director retention in these deals.  Results show that these 
directors are retained more often in related deals and could be consistent with CEO opportunism.  
However, target directors retained in either related or diversified deals are both characterized as 
high quality directors (CEO, directorship, and merger experience).   
Given that the post-merger board contains more unaffiliated directors than target directors 
retained, we next examine the addition of unaffiliated directors (Model 2).    None of our variables 
designed to measure firm need or the general controls appear to explain the addition of unaffiliated 
directors at the firm-level.  All previously documented results, however, suggest that unaffiliated 
directors are added for their prior executive and director experience.  Importantly, retirement does 
not play a role in the percentage of unaffiliated directors added as the percentage of pre-merger 
acquirer directors over 72 provides no explanatory power.14  Finally, we examine the percentage 
of pre-merger acquirer directors not retained (Model 3).  Similar to target director retention and 
                                                          
14 The mandatory retirement age for directors is 72 years (Cline and Yore, 2014).  Results are robust to using the 
percentage of directors 65, 68, or 70 or older or average director age instead of the percentage of directors 72 or older. 
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consistent with firm need, the percentage of acquirer directors not retained increases with relative 
deal size and deal complexity (target R&D).  Overall, results from Table 7 suggest that changes to 
board structure and composition around mergers are driven by firm need and complexity.   
 Table 8 focuses on bargaining related to the percentage of the combined board comprised 
of: retained target directors (Model 1), retained target outside directors (Model 2), retained target 
inside directors (Model 3), and whether the target CEO is retained (Model 4).  The percentage of 
target directors added is significantly negatively related to target announcement returns; consistent 
with a tradeoff of power for premium where target directors negotiate for seats on the post-merger 
board in exchange for a lower premium (Wulf, 2004).  We find that even where it is likely targets 
trade power-for-premium, target directors retained are still of higher quality (CEO, directorship, 
and merger experience) (unreported).  From an acquirer’s view, retention of these target directors 
appears driven by firm need rather than CEO opportunism.  Target takeover defenses (e.g., poison 
pill or classified board) may strengthen its bargaining position and allow a board to better negotiate 
representation on the post-merger board.  The presence of a target poison pill/classified board has 
a significantly positive effect on the percentage of target directors post-merger and supports the 
notion that the post-merger board is an outcome of bargaining between acquirers and targets.15   
Models 2 – 4 of Table 8 decompose retained target directors into outsiders, insiders, and 
target CEO.  The results suggest that the power for premium trade-off documented in Model 1 is 
concentrated in outside target director retention.  Consistent with Bargeron et al. (2013), we do not 
find that target CEO retention is related to this trade-off.   
                                                          
15 Targets may also adopt these structures to protect their exploitable assets, so the relation between target director 
retention and governance may be related to the integration rather than bargaining. In our sample, however, there is no 
correlation between measures of target complexity (R&D expenditures) and classified board/poison pill.    
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Finally, Table 9 explores agency explanations for board changes around mergers using the 
same methodology as Table 7.  As noted, the CEO opportunism motive predicts that firms with 
more powerful CEOs should experience more change to the post-merger board.  Across our four 
measures of CEO power (board capture, CEO-Chair duality, connections between the acquirer 
CEO and directors, and CEO ownership) and our three measures of board changes, we find very 
little evidence that board changes around mergers are associated with agency conflicts.  In 
particular, only director connections to the CEO has a significantly positive impact on target 
director retention.  In all other instances, there is no relation between measures of CEO power and 
board changes, except acquirers with higher board capture, CEO-Chair duality and higher CEO 
ownership are less likely to retain target directors and not retain incumbent acquirer directors.   
Overall, results from Tables 7 and 8 suggest that both firm need and bargaining play an 
important role in changes to board structure and composition around mergers, while Table 9 
provides little evidence that acquirer CEO opportunism are driving these changes. 
4.4 Unaffiliated and Retained Target Director Tenure 
Examining board tenure provides additional insight into the motives for board changes 
around mergers.  Our three motives for post-merger board changes: firm need, agency, and 
bargaining (target) have different implications for the length of director retention.  Unaffiliated 
and target directors chosen to fulfill long-term specific firm needs are likely retained longer.  
However, target directors primarily added to facilitate bargaining (i.e., complete the deal at a lower 
premia) fulfill their purpose at deal closing.  Also, target directors may be retained for shorter-term 
needs, such as aiding the post-merger integration process.  For both the bargaining and integration 
motives, we would expect target director tenure to be short-lived.  In contrast, target directors 
chosen on the basis of long-term firm need would be expected to have a longer tenure. 
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 Table 10 summarizes the director tenure results and finds that 70% of all new directors 
remain longer than three years, suggesting that board changes around mergers are fairly 
permanent.16  Panel A segments new directors into unaffiliated and target. We find that 75% of 
unaffiliated directors remain for at least three years post-merger, which is significantly greater than 
the 70% retention of new directors for three plus years in the propensity score-matched non-merger 
sample.  This result provides additional evidence that these changes are relatively more permanent.  
For target directors, however, only 63% remain on the post-merger board for more than three years.   
Panel B segments directors by whether they stay or go over this three-year horizon.  In 
general, directors that stay long-term have more CEO-merger experience, financial expertise, and 
are on key committees (audit, compensation, and nominating).  This result is consistent with firm 
need; the more permanent shifts in acquiring firm boards reflect directors with outside executive 
and deal experience and utilization of these talents in more prominent board roles.   In addition, 
directors with longer tenure are not more connected to the acquirer CEO than those with shorter 
tenure; which is also consistent with upgrading a board’s skill set and inconsistent with agency 
motives.  These results hold whether we examine unaffiliated or target directors (untabulated). 
While target directors added also represent an upgrade in board skill, it is not clear why 
fewer stay long-term.  We explore two explanations: bargaining and integration.  If the observed 
shorter tenure is a function of bargaining, we would expect this to be more prevalent in deals where 
targets receive a relatively lower premium.  However, in Panel C of Table 10 comparing deals 
with high and low premia, we find that target directors in low premia mergers have a longer tenure.  
This result is inconsistent with bargaining driving shorter tenure for retained target directors.   
                                                          
16 Results are qualitatively similar if examine alternate tenure horizons such as one-year or two-years. 
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If integration is a reason for this shorter tenure, we would expect that the subset of target 
directors with shorter tenure to be concentrated in cases where target integration is more of a 
concern: large, diversifying, and complex deals.  Retained target directors have significantly 
shorter tenure in more complex deals (Panel C).  Furthermore, Panel D examines characteristics 
of target directors that are retained for less than three years.  Results show that retained target 
directors in more complex deals have significantly more financial, industry, CEO, and CEO-
merger experience.  All results in Table 10 hold if the sample is limited to directors less than the 
age of 72, 69, or 65.  These findings are consistent with the notion that target directors with skills 
related to merger integration are retained in deals that likely require more such support.   
In unreported tests, we repeat these analyses in a multivariate framework controlling for 
director characteristics (age, experience, committee membership, etc.) and board classification.  
Consistent with Table 10, unaffiliated directors are significantly more likely to remain on the 
combined board for more than three years as compared to retained target directors.17  In addition, 
the shorter tenure of target directors continues to manifest in more complex deals, consistent with 
integration as the motive for shorter target director retention.  Overall, our results suggest that the 
substantial changes to acquirer boards are relatively permanent and directors added in mergers 
reflect a demand for skills related to the monitoring and advising needs of the post-merger firm. 
5.  Robustness 
We conduct robustness on subsamples based on time and regulation. SOX impacted board 
structures and makeup (Linck et al., 2009).  In addition, regulated firms may demand different 
expertise or regulators may limit board composition (Houston and James, 1995; Kole and Lehn, 
1999).  In unreported results, we analyze sub-samples of pre- and post-SOX as well as excluding 
                                                          
17 Unaffiliated directors are 15% more likely to remain for more than three years than retained target directors.   
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financials and utilities and find the significant board changes around mergers are consistent across 
time periods and industries.  We conduct all analyses in Tables 2 - 9 on these sub-samples and 
while there are idiosyncratic differences, our general results remain. Boards change substantially 
around mergers and directors are added to the post-merger board in an attempt to improve the 
executive and deal experience of the board or due to bargaining between the merger participants. 
In sensitivity tests examining the determinants of target director retention, the addition of 
unaffiliated directors and the departure of acquirer directors (Tables 7-9), we control for additional 
factors that may impact the degree of change around mergers: serial acquirer (whether the firm 
engages in other acquisitions in the prior two years), free cash flow, leverage, geographic 
segments, operational segments, acquirer announcement return, geographic distance between the 
acquirer and target, and target firm governance measures as well as target industry homogeneity, 
average analyst forecast error or analyst coverage.  Inclusion of these variables does not further 
explain post-merger board composition or alter our other results.   
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
Prior literature has given little attention to changes in boards of acquiring firms.  This is 
surprising given the importance of the board of directors and the potential for changes in the firm’s 
monitoring and advising needs around a merger.  It is possible that certain factors, like transaction 
costs, restrict adjustments to optimal board structure and composition, implying the relative 
stability of the post-merger board.  Alternatively, theory suggests adjustments to the post-merger 
board as the monitoring and advising needs of the firm change due to the merger.   
Our results indicate dynamic shifts in acquirer boards around mergers that are significantly 
different from both non-merging firm and non-merger years.  Directors are added to the post-
merger board at a significantly higher rate than for non-acquiring firms.  In over 40% of deals, 
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board size increases even though an acquirer director frequently departs.  Board size also decreases 
in nearly 25% of deals although firm size and complexity increase.  Overall, acquirer board size 
and/or composition change 84% of the time and these changes are driven primarily by firm need 
and bargaining.  The addition of unaffiliated and/or target directors reflects demand for monitoring 
and advising the post-merger firm and improved director quality.  In addition, target firms 
negotiate representation on the post-merger board when they have relatively more bargaining 
power compared to the acquirer firm or in exchange for accepting lower merger premiums.    
Examining director level characteristics, unaffiliated and target directors added after 
mergers have significantly different attributes from directors added to boards of non-merging 
firms.  Skills related to executive and deal experience are more valued around mergers, while 
general skills such as education and financial expertise are sought in non-merger years.  Moreover, 
directors added to the post-merger board have more outside board and executive experience than 
both retained and not retained acquirer directors, suggesting boards upgrade overall talent around 
a merger.  Finally, significant adjustments to acquiring firm boards around mergers are relatively 
permanent as a vast majority of these new directors remain on the post-merger board long-term. 
Our results provide evidence on the dynamics of acquirer boards and, more generally, on 
director selection.  Mergers provide a unique setting to contrast the characteristics of candidates 
added, retained and not selected, offering insights into attributes valued in the director labor 
market.  Our evidence suggests that acquirers improve overall board quality and place an increased 
importance on executive and deal experience in director selection around mergers.  Overall, we 
complement prior studies on the determinants of board structure by providing insight into the 
dynamic nature and board structure and the characteristics valued in the director labor market.
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Appendix A:  Variable Definitions  
 
 Variable Definition 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics   
Deal Value ($ mil) Transaction value ($ millions) 
Relative Deal Size Deal transaction value scaled by acquirer market value of equity 
Acquirer CAR Acquirer 3-day cumulative abnormal return (-1, +1) around the merger 
announcement date 
Target CAR Target 3-day cumulative abnormal return (-1, +1) around the merger 
announcement date 
Premium Final bid price scaled by target share price 42 days prior to merger 
announcement minus one 
Diversifying Deal Indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer and target are in different 
Fama-French 12 industries, zero otherwise 
All Equity  Indicator variable equal to one if merger is 100% financed with equity, 
zero otherwise 
All Cash Indicator variable equal to one if merger is 100% financed with cash, 
zero otherwise 
Tender Offer Indicator variable equal to one for those deals announced via a tender 
offer, zero otherwise 
Hostile Indicator variable equal to one for those deals where the acquiring firm 
makes a hostile takeover attempt, zero otherwise 
Multiple Bidders Indicator variable equal to one if a target firm receives more than one 
takeover offer, zero otherwise 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics  
Firm Size ($ million) Total book value of assets 
Business Segments  Number of unique business segments 
ROA Net income scaled by total book value of assets 
R&D Research and development expenditures scaled by total book value   
of assets 
Leverage Total book value of debt scaled by total book value of assets 
Top 5 Institutional Ownership (%) Percentage of total outstanding shares held by the largest five 
institutional owners 
Stock Performance One-year buy and hold abnormal returns 
Stock Volatility Standard deviation of annual monthly returns  
Board Size Total number of directors on the board 
Independence Percentage of independent directors on the board 
Captured Percentage of outside directors with tenure less than the current CEO 
CEO-Chair Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also chair of the board,  
zero otherwise 
CEO Age CEO age in years 
Directors >= Age 72 Percentage of the board that is 72 years or older 
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Appendix A (continued):  Variable Definitions  
 
  Variable Definition  
Panel C: Director Characteristics  
Outsider Indicator variable equal to one if director is an outsider, zero otherwise 
Director Tenure  Director tenure in years 
Director Age Director age in years 
Female Indicator variable equal to one if director is female, zero otherwise 
Outside Directorships Total number of additional public board seats held 
Hold Outside Directorships Indicator variable equal to one if director holds additional public board 
seats, zero otherwise 
Higher Education  Indicator variable equal to one if director holds post-secondary degree, 
zero otherwise 
Financial Expert  Indicator variable equal to one if director holds CFA or CPA or has 
prior/current CFO experience, zero otherwise  
Outside CEO Experience Indicator variable equal to one if director is currently or previously CEO 
of an outside public firm, zero otherwise 
Merger Experience Indicator variable equal to one if director has previously served on a 
board that engaged in an acquisition, zero otherwise 
CEO-Merger Experience Indicator variable equal to one if director has previously served as CEO 
of a firm that engaged in an acquisition, zero otherwise 
Target Industry Experience  Indicator variable equal to one if director has additional employment or 
director experience in target Fama-French 12 industry, zero otherwise 
Connected to CEO Indicator variable equal to one if director currently/previously served on 
the same board or worked at the same firm as the acquirer CEO, zero 
otherwise 
Audit Committee Member Indicator variable equal to one if director sits on the audit committee, 
zero otherwise 
Compensation Committee Member Indicator variable equal to one if director sits on the compensation 
committee, zero otherwise 
Nominating Committee Member Indicator variable equal to one if director sits on the nominating 
committee, zero otherwise 
Highest Ranked Seat Indicator variable equal to one if acquirer (target) firm seat is director’s 
largest directorship in terms of market capitalization, zero otherwise 
Lowest Ranked Seat Indicator variable equal to one if acquirer (target) firm seat is director’s 
smallest directorship in terms of market capitalization, zero otherwise 
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Appendix B: Propensity Score-Matching Model Results 
 
The table reports the results of the propensity score-matching model estimating the likelihood of engaging in a merger.  All 
independent variables are calculated as of the prior fiscal year end.  Year and industry fixed effects are also included.  All variable 
definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values based on standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses and a, b, and c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Merger (0/1) 
Constant -3.481a 
 (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.238a 
 (0.000) 
Leverage -0.162c 
 (0.074) 
Stock Performance 0.039c 
 (0.090) 
Tobin’s Q 0.012 
 (0.150) 
Independence 0.102 
 (0.392) 
CEO-Chair Duality 0.041 
 (0.235) 
CEO Age -0.004c 
 (0.081) 
Board Size 0.012c 
 (0.071) 
Unaffiliated Added -0.065c 
 (0.059) 
Incumbent Departs 0.011 
 (0.757) 
Observations 28,861 
Pseudo r2 0.168 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
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Figure 1: Changes to Acquirer Board Surrounding Mergers 
 
The figure reports changes to the board of directors for firms that engage in an at least one acquisition during the sample period 
1996-2012.  Changes to the board in year t-1 and year t+1 are compared to board changes in the year surrounding the merger, year 
t.  Changes include the percentage of the board that is new, percentage of the board that is retained, percentage of the board that is 
not retained, the likelihood of adding a new director, and the likelihood of not retaining an incumbent director.  The unshaded bar 
represents year t-1, the black bar represents the merger year, and the shaded bar represents year t+1.   
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Table 1:  Deal and Firm Characteristics 
 
The table reports summary statistics for 1,153 deals from 1996-2012.  Panel A contains deal characteristics.  Panel B includes 
differences in means of firm characteristics for acquirer pre-deal, target pre-deal and post-merger firms.  Panel C reports summary 
statistics on board characteristics.  All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels.  a, b, and c denote statistically significant differences in means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Deal Characteristics    
 Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
Deal Value ($ mil)  $3,725  $990  $9,616  $323   $3,071 
Relative Deal Size 0.461 0.219 0.820 0.060 0.610
Acquirer CAR -1.5% -1.0% 6.5% -4.3% 1.4%
Target CAR 25.1% 20.1% 24.9% 8.8% 34.6%
Premium  40.5% 34.3% 36.7% 18.7% 54.4%
Diversifying Deal  33.2%     
All Equity  24.9%     
All Cash  35.6%     
Tender Offer 16.9%     
Hostile 1.0%     
Multiple Bidders 4.9%     
Panel B:  Firm Characteristics   
 
Acquirer 
(1) 
Target  
(2) 
Post-Merger 
(3) (1) – (2) (3) – (1)
Firm Size ($ mil)  $59,142  $7,407  $76,049  $51,734a  $16,907 a 
Business Segments 2.971 1.732 3.087 1.239 a 0.116 b
R&D 0.031 0.058 0.031 -0.026 a 0.000
ROA 0.117 0.066 0.096 0.051 a -0.021 a
Stock Performance 16.8% 9.5%         – 7.3% b      –
Top 5 Institutional Ownership 24.2% 26.5% 24.5% -2.3% a 0.3% b
CEO Ownership 2.39% 1.89% 1.95% 0.50% -0.44% b
Poison Pill – 37.9%         –      –      – 
Classified Board 51.1% 59.8% 49.4% -8.5% a -1.7% a
Panel C:  Board Characteristics   
 
Acquirer 
(1) 
Target  
(2) 
Post-Merger 
(3) (1) – (2) (3) – (1)
Board Size 10.87 8.90 11.48 1.96 a 0.61 a 
Independence 73.7% 70.3% 74.7% 3.4% a 1.0% 
Directors >= Age 72 6.3% 6.6% 6.4% -0.3% 0.1% 
Female 11.3% 7.7% 11.7% 3.6% a 0.4% 
Director Tenure 7.73 7.39 7.46 0.34 b -0.28 c 
Outside Directorships 1.12 0.76 1.08 0.35 a -0.04 
Hold Additional Seats 54.3% 40.2% 54.0% 14.1% a -0.3% 
Higher Education 57.6% 49.7% 58.5% 7.9% a 0.8% 
Financial Expert 12.5 % 12.6% 13.1% -0.1%  0.6% 
Outside CEO Experience 22.3% 25.2% 22.9% -2.9% a 0.5% 
Merger Experience 80.4% 52.1% 73.9% 28.3% a -6.5% a 
CEO-Merger Experience 9.9% 7.2% 16.4% 2.7% a 6.5% a 
Target Industry Experience 24.6% 34.8% 25.9% -10.2% a 1.3% 
Connected to CEO 10.0% 0.8% 7.3% 9.2% a -2.7% a 
Captured 54.9% 51.1% 55.9% 3.7% a 1.1% a 
CEO-Chair  66.0% 59% 62% 7.0% a -3.0% c 
CEO Age 55.50 54.59 55.87 0.91 a 0.37  
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Table 2: Board Structure – Acquiring Firms versus Non-Acquiring Firms 
 
The table compares board dynamics of firm-years involving a merger with a public target to a propensity score-matched sample of firm-years with no merger activity.  Results of 
the propensity score model are reported in Appendix B.  There are 1,008 merger firm-years in each of the pre- and post-merger periods and 6,346 non-merger firm-years in each of 
the pre- and post-merger periods.  Panel A considers all merger and non-merger firm-years.  Panel B splits firm-year matches into relative deal size terciles and reports the difference-
in-difference effect only.  a, b, and c denote statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A 
Pre-  Post-   
Merger Non-Merger Diff.  Merger Non-Merger Diff.  Diff-in-diff 
% of Board – Unaffiliated Director 9.61% 9.27% 0.34%  9.90% 7.92% 1.98%a  1.65%a 
≥ 1 Unaffiliated director added 54.66% 51.95% 2.71%  58.33% 50.79% 7.55%a  4.84%a 
% of Board – Not Retained 9.25% 9.18% 0.07%  12.80% 7.88% 4.92%a  4.84%a 
≥ 1 Director departs 55.46% 52.99% 2.46%  65.48% 50.61% 14.86%a  12.40%a 
∆ Board size 0.04 0.00 0.04  0.60 -0.02 0.62a  0.58a 
Board size increases 27.28% 24.93% 2.35%  41.96% 24.98% 16.99%a  14.64%a 
     & director departs 12.10% 10.05% 2.05%c  23.91% 8.29% 15.62%a  13.57%a 
Board size does not change 45.73% 49.80% -4.06%  35.71% 49.51% -13.80%a  -9.74%a 
     & director departs 16.96% 18.01% -1.05%b  19.25% 17.11% 2.13%c  3.18% 
Board size decreases 26.98% 25.28% 1.71%  22.32% 25.51% -3.19%b  -4.90%a 
     & director added 10.71% 9.23% 1.48%  10.71% 8.95% 1.76%c  0.28% 
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Table 2: Board Structure – Acquiring Firms versus Non-Acquiring Firms (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B 
Merger-  
Low Size     
(1) 
Merger-  
Medium Size  
(2) 
Merger-   
High Size      
(3) 
% of Board – Unaffiliated Director 1.59%c 3.13%a 0.30% 
≥ 1 Unaffiliated director added 3.32% 6.43%c 5.31%c 
% of Board – Not Retained 2.85%a 4.15%a 6.56%a 
≥ 1 Director departs 11.16%a 9.27%a 14.81%a 
∆ Board size -0.10 0.44a 1.58a 
Board size increases -5.12% 15.55%a 37.25%a 
     & director departs -0.24% 10.91%a 32.09%a 
Board size does not change 2.56% -12.35%a -21.10%a 
     & director departs 8.06%a 1.09% -1.49% 
Board size decreases 2.56% -3.20% -16.15%a 
     & director added 1.42% 1.42% -3.73%c 
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Table 3: Board Dynamics around Mergers – Difference-in-difference  
 
The table presents OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the change in board size (Models 1 and 4), an indicator equal 
to one if an unaffiliated director is added to the board (Models 2 and 5), and an indicator variable equal to one if a director departs 
the board (Models 3 and 6).   Merger is an indicator equal to one for 2,016 firm-years in the year prior to and following a firm 
engaging in a merger and equal to zero for 12,692 non-merger propensity score-matched firm-years.  Post is an indicator equal to 
one for merging firms and non-merger matched firms in the year following the merger and zero otherwise.  All other independent 
variables are calculated as of the prior fiscal year end.  Year and industry fixed effects are also included.  All variable definitions 
are included in Appendix A.  p-values based on standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses and a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 3: Board Dynamics around Mergers – Difference-in-difference (Continued)  
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
∆ Board 
size 
≥ 1 
Unaffiliated 
director 
added 
≥ 1 
Director 
departs 
 
∆ Board 
size 
≥ 1 
Unaffiliated 
director 
added 
≥ 1 
Director 
departs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant -0.023 0.039 0.067b  1.678a -0.358a -0.748a 
 (0.693) (0.195) (0.036)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Merger 0.052 0.030c 0.022  0.089c 0.011 0.001 
 (0.263) (0.073) (0.193)  (0.052) (0.481) (0.967) 
Post -0.005 0.012c -0.013c  -0.005 0.009 -0.015b 
 (0.789) (0.091) (0.066)  (0.787) (0.205) (0.029) 
Merger x Post 0.562a 0.043b 0.122a  0.560a 0.040c 0.120a 
 (0.000) (0.038) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) 
Board Size     -0.177a -0.004c 0.045a 
     (0.000) (0.090) (0.000) 
Firm Size     0.098a 0.047a 0.008b 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) 
Leverage     -0.126 -0.024 0.013 
     (0.128) (0.436) (0.685) 
R&D     0.037 0.046 -0.090 
     (0.825) (0.575) (0.287) 
ROA     -0.026 -0.053 -0.146a 
     (0.820) (0.280) (0.002) 
Stock Performance     0.064a 0.005 -0.026a 
     (0.003) (0.535) (0.003) 
Stock Volatility     -0.387 0.265a 0.480a 
     (0.143) (0.002) (0.000) 
Average Director 
Age 
    0.009b 0.002 -0.002 
    (0.016) (0.285) (0.219) 
Top 5 Institutional 
Ownership 
    -0.258b -0.023 0.014 
    (0.039) (0.635) (0.764) 
Independence     0.225c 0.056 0.080b 
     (0.066) (0.164) (0.044) 
CEO-Chair Duality     0.037 -0.014 -0.019c 
     (0.185) (0.207) (0.090) 
Observations 14,708 14,708 14,708  14,708 14,708 14,708 
r2 0.02 0.02 0.03  0.12 0.05 0.10 
Year & Industry    
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4:  Director Characteristics – Merger Years versus Non-Merger Years  
 
The table compares director characteristics of firm-years involving a merger with a public target to firm-years with no merger 
activity.  Panel A compares years in which a firm engages in a merger to a propensity score-matched sample of firms based on pre-
merger firm characteristics that do not engage in a merger.  This sample includes 1,189 (933) unaffiliated (retained target) director-
firm-years in merger years and 6,051 new director-firm-years in non-merger years.  Panel B compares years in which a firm engages 
in a merger to a matched sample of firms in the same year, Fama-French 12 industry and firm size decile based on post-merger size 
that do not engage in a merger.  This sample includes 1,459 (1,089) unaffiliated (retained target) director-firm-years in merger 
years and 12,872 new director-firm-years in non-merger years.  Column (1) compares the mean characteristics of all new directors 
in merger years (unaffiliated and retained target) to new directors in non-merger years. Column (2) compares mean characteristics 
of unaffiliated directors in merger years to new directors in non-merger years. Column (3) compares mean characteristics of retained 
target directors in merger years to new directors in non-merger years.  a, b, and c denote statistically significant differences in means 
between merger and non-merger years at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
  
Panel A:  Propensity Score-
Matched Firm Comparison 
{Unaffiliated & 
Retained Target} 
vs. Non-Merger     
(1)  
Unaffiliated     
vs. Non-Merger 
(2)  
 
Retained Target 
vs. Non-Merger 
(3) 
 Merger 
Non-
Merger  Merger
Non-
Merger  Merger 
Non-
Merger 
Outsider 87% 85%a  86% 84%  89% 85%a 
Age 58.0 56.1a  56.5 56.2  60.0 56.1a 
Female 12% 14%c  15% 14%  9% 14%a 
Higher Education 56% 65%a  58% 66%a  53% 66%a 
Financial Expert 7% 10%a  8% 10%c  6% 10%a 
Hold Outside Directorships 54% 50%a  53% 51%  55% 50%b 
Outside CEO Experience 25% 18%a  25% 20%a  26% 18%a 
Merger Experience 44% 28%a  30% 29%  61% 29%a 
CEO-Merger Experience 19% 8%a  18% 10%a  19% 9%a 
Panel B: Post-merger Size 
Matched Firm Comparison 
{Unaffiliated & 
Retained Target} 
vs. Non-Merger     
(1)  
Unaffiliated     
vs. Non-Merger 
(2)  
 
Retained Target 
vs. Non-Merger 
(3) 
 Merger 
Non-
Merger  Merger
Non-
Merger  Merger 
Non-
Merger 
Outsider 87% 85%  85% 85%  88% 85%c 
Age 58.0 55.4a  56.6 55.4a  59.8 55.2a 
Female 12% 16%a  14% 16%  9% 16%a 
Higher Education 55% 66%a  56% 66%a  52% 66%a 
Financial Expert 7% 9%a  7% 9%a  6% 10%a 
Hold Outside Directorships 53% 51%  51% 52%  56% 48%b 
Outside CEO Experience 25% 19%a  25% 20%a  26% 17%a 
Merger Experience 41% 29%a  28% 30%  59% 27%a 
CEO-Merger Experience 18% 7%a  17% 8%a  19% 6%a 
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Table 5:  Determinants of Aggregate Director Selection – Acquirer and Target Pools 
 
The table details logistic models estimating director selection onto the post-merger board from pools of potential candidates.  All 
regressions contain deal fixed-effects.  Column (1) analyzes director selection from the candidate pool containing acquirer and 
target directors, the pool in column (2) contains only target directors, and column (3) contains only acquirer directors.  Column (1) 
includes all mergers, column (2) includes only mergers in which at least one target director was retained, and column (3) includes 
only mergers in which at least one acquirer director was not retained.  The dependent variable for all logit models is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the director is selected for the post-merger board and zero if not selected.  All other variable definitions are 
included in Appendix A.  p-values are included in parentheses.  a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Acquirer & 
Target  
Selection 
(1) 
Target Selection 
≥ 1 Target 
Retained 
(2) 
Acquirer Selection
≥ 1 Acquirer      
Not Retained  
(3) 
Outsider 0.545a 0.659b 0.795a 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
Age -0.033a -0.022a -0.057a 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Female 0.234a -0.324c 0.265b 
 (0.006) (0.069) (0.024) 
Higher Education  0.074 0.004 0.062 
 (0.165) (0.968) (0.384) 
Financial Expert  -0.002 -0.181 0.150 
 (0.979) (0.251) (0.176) 
Hold Outside Directorships  0.513a 0.861a 0.292a 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Outside CEO Experience -0.060 0.259c -0.214b 
 (0.357) (0.058) (0.011) 
Target Industry Experience -0.187a -0.183 -0.207b 
 (0.009) (0.168) (0.035) 
Merger Experience 0.567a -0.169 0.778a 
 (0.000) (0.275) (0.000) 
Connected to CEO -0.052 0.703 0.122 
 (0.660) (0.190) (0.379) 
Highest Ranked Seat 0.298a 0.054 0.165 
 (0.001) (0.776) (0.142) 
Lowest Ranked Seat -0.052 -0.383b 0.124 
 (0.579) (0.048) (0.329) 
Acquirer Director 4.284a   
 (0.000)   
Target CEO 1.214a 1.456a  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Acquirer CEO  1.234a  1.404a 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Tenure -0.018a 0.014 -0.031a 
 (0.000) (0.182) (0.000) 
    
Observations 17,849 2,427 7,108 
Pseudo r2 0.570 0.056 0.073 
Deal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6:  Determinants of Specific Director Selection – Unaffiliated, Retained and Not Retained 
 
The table details logistic models comparing unaffiliated and target directors to selected and not selected acquirer and target 
directors.  All regressions contain deal fixed-effects.  Columns 1-4 examines unaffiliated directors, while Columns 5 - 6 examine 
retained target directors.  In particular, Column (1) compares unaffiliated directors to not retained acquirer directors, column (2) 
compares unaffiliated directors to not retained target directors, column (3) compares unaffiliated directors to retained acquirer 
directors and column (4) compares unaffiliated directors to retained target directors, Column (5) compares retained target directors 
to not retained acquirer directors, and column (6) compares retained target directors to retained acquirer directors..  The dependent 
variable for all logit models is an indicator variable equal to one if the director is an unaffiliated or retained target director and zero 
for the comparison director.  Each regression in the table only includes deals with both types of directors involved in the comparison.  
All other variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values are included in parentheses.  a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Unaffiliated vs.  Target Retained vs. 
 Not Retained  Retained 
 Not 
Retained 
 
Retained 
 
Acquirer 
(1) 
Target 
(2)  
Acquirer 
(3) 
Target 
(4) 
 Acquirer 
(5) 
 Acquirer 
(6) 
Outsider 0.558a 0.182  0.666a 0.809a  -0.404b  0.138 
 (0.007) (0.105)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.035) 
 (0.210) 
Age -0.049a -0.024a  -0.024a -0.005  -0.063a  -0.006 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.672)  (0.000) 
 (0.303) 
Female 0.505b 0.645a  0.188 0.260  0.027  -0.231 
 (0.015) (0.000)  (0.127) (0.355)  (0.907) 
 (0.101) 
Higher Education -0.135 0.109  0.046 0.152  -0.129  -0.099 
 (0.313) (0.174)  (0.606) (0.374)  (0.322) 
 (0.239) 
Financial Expert 0.347c -0.040  0.182 0.750a  -0.338  -0.369a 
 (0.073) (0.712)  (0.137) (0.004)  (0.109) 
 (0.006) 
Hold Outside  0.578a 0.891a  0.399a -0.020  0.626a  0.288a 
   Directorships (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.920)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
Outside CEO  0.539a 0.488a  0.689a 0.498b  0.348b  0.432a 
   Experience (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.000) 
Target Industry  0.719a -0.411a  0.406a 0.174  0.360b  0.536a 
   Experience (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.462)  (0.029)  (0.000) 
Merger Experience -3.230a -1.677a  -3.766a -2.802a  -0.821a  -1.438a 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 (0.000) 
Connected to CEO -0.088 2.474a  -0.469a 1.333a  -2.319a  -2.745a 
 (0.694) (0.000)  (0.009) (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
          
Observations 2,091 5,387  6,922 1,116  1,472  4,343 
Pseudo r2 0.428 0.174  0.399 0.299  0.157  0.126 
Deal Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 7:  Determinants of Board Dynamics – Firm Need 
 
The table presents Tobit regressions where the dependent variables are the percentage of the post-merger board that is retained 
target directors (Model 1), the percentage of the post-merger board that is unaffiliated directors (Model 2), and the percentage of 
the pre-merger acquirer board that is not retained (Model 3).  Year and Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects are also included.  
All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values based on standard errors clustered by Fama-French 12 industry are 
in parentheses and a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
% Combined Board: 
Retained Target 
% Combined Board: 
Unaffiliated 
% Acquirer Board: 
Not Retained 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.249a 0.039 -0.047 
 (0.004) (0.608) (0.638) 
Relative Deal Size 0.160a 0.015 0.058b 
 (0.000) (0.420) (0.028) 
Diversifying Deal -0.085a 0.010 -0.026 
 (0.000) (0.583) (0.166) 
Target R&D 0.069a -0.017 0.032a 
 (0.000) (0.111) (0.000) 
Target Business Segments 0.012 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.110) (0.888) (0.361) 
All Equity 0.123a -0.007 0.067a 
 (0.000) (0.585) (0.000) 
All Cash -0.183a 0.013 0.006 
 (0.000) (0.446) (0.780) 
Tender Offer -0.104b -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.771) (0.597) 
Hostile -0.139b -0.024 -0.142b 
 (0.047) (0.753) (0.042) 
Multiple Bidders -0.113b 0.030 0.003 
 (0.031) (0.335) (0.895) 
Acquirer Board Independence 0.003 -0.041 0.029 
 (0.943) (0.316) (0.506) 
Acquirer CEO Age -0.001 0.002a 0.003a 
 (0.585) (0.007) (0.007) 
Acquirer Directors Age >= 72 -0.023 -0.056 -0.178c 
(0.743) (0.277) (0.072) 
Acquirer Stock Performance -0.070a 0.010 -0.025a 
(0.006) (0.426) (0.001) 
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 
Pseudo r2 0.65 0.15 0.34 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8:  Determinants of Board Dynamics: Bargaining 
 
The table presents regressions modeling the power for premium tradeoff.  Models 1-3 are Tobit regressions and Model 4 is a linear 
probability model.  The dependent variables are the percentage of the post-merger board that is retained target directors (Model 1), 
the percentage of the post-merger board that is retained target outside directors (Model 2), the percentage of the post-merger board 
that is retained target inside directors (Model 3), and an indicator equal to one if the target CEO is retained on the post-merger 
board (Model 4).  Year and Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects are also included.  All variable definitions are included in 
Appendix A.  p-values based on standard errors clustered by Fama-French 12 industry are in parentheses and a, b, and c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
% Combined Board: 
Retained Target 
% Combined Board: 
Retained Target 
Outsider 
% Combined Board: 
Retained Target 
Insider 
Target CEO 
Retained 
(0/1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -0.172c -0.194c -0.125b 0.220c 
 (0.082) (0.052) (0.017) (0.080) 
Target CAR -0.175a -0.170a -0.069 -0.083 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.245) (0.234) 
Target Stock 
Performance 
-0.037 -0.032 -0.024c -0.017 
(0.223) (0.274) (0.076) (0.488) 
Target Poison Pill 0.024 0.018 0.031a 0.037c 
 (0.110) (0.250) (0.001) (0.050) 
Target Classified 
Board 
0.029c 0.034b -0.009 0.025 
(0.067) (0.020) (0.383) (0.383) 
Relative Deal Size 0.148a 0.150a 0.028c 0.086c 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.057) 
Diversifying Deal -0.062a -0.074a 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.554) (0.737) 
All Equity 0.117a 0.108a 0.057a 0.120a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
All Cash -0.171a -0.167a -0.077b -0.089a 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.007) 
Tender Offer -0.086a -0.071c -0.056c -0.031 
 (0.004) (0.060) (0.079) (0.165) 
Hostile -0.148b -0.117b -0.696a -0.176a 
 (0.012) (0.039) (0.000) (0.003) 
Multiple Bidders -0.112b -0.094c -0.094b -0.144b 
 (0.021) (0.052) (0.027) (0.015) 
Acquirer Board 
Independence 
0.001 0.028 -0.061c -0.058 
(0.987) (0.592) (0.083) (0.413) 
Acquirer CEO Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.474) (0.366) (0.990) (0.565) 
Acquirer Directors 
Age >= 72 
-0.009 -0.034 0.019 0.092 
(0.910) (0.745) (0.820) (0.328) 
Acquirer Stock 
Performance 
-0.051 -0.055c 0.001 -0.019 
(0.105) (0.065) (0.937) (0.532) 
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125 
r2 0.66 0.69 0.50 0.18 
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
47 
 
 
Table 9:  Determinants of Board Dynamics – Agency 
 
The table presents Tobit regressions where the dependent variables are the percentage of the post-merger board that is retained 
target directors (Model 1), the percentage of the post-merger board that is unaffiliated directors (Model 2), and the percentage of 
the pre-merger acquirer board that is not retained (Model 3).  Year and Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects are also included.  
All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  p-values based on standard errors clustered by Fama-French 12 industry are 
in parentheses and a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
% Combined Board: 
Retained Target 
% Combined Board: 
Unaffiliated 
% Acquirer Board: 
Not Retained 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.022 0.073 0.076 
 (0.867) (0.360) (0.395) 
Acquirer Board Captured -0.052b -0.030 -0.048 
 (0.035) (0.143) (0.104) 
Acquirer CEO-Chair  -0.035b 0.018 -0.001 
 (0.022) (0.444) (0.977) 
Acquirer % Connected to 
Acquirer CEO  
0.136a -0.056 0.047 
(0.005) (0.134) (0.344) 
Acquirer CEO Ownership -0.074 -0.068 -0.225a 
 (0.214) (0.307) (0.001) 
Acquirer Top 5 Institutional 
Ownership 
0.108 -0.078 -0.120 
(0.252) (0.258) (0.135) 
Diversifying Deal -0.075a 0.009 -0.024 
 (0.000) (0.651) (0.203) 
All Equity 0.109a -0.005 0.064a 
 (0.000) (0.700) (0.000) 
All Cash -0.272a 0.004 -0.017 
 (0.000) (0.795) (0.380) 
Tender Offer -0.154a -0.008 -0.019 
 (0.003) (0.660) (0.316) 
Hostile -0.137b -0.022 -0.128 
 (0.029) (0.787) (0.125) 
Multiple Bidders -0.031 0.038 0.030 
 (0.522) (0.274) (0.294) 
Acquirer Board Independence -0.047 -0.059 -0.008 
 (0.433) (0.108) (0.870) 
Acquirer CEO Age -0.001 0.002a 0.003b 
 (0.766) (0.003) (0.028) 
Acquirer Directors Age >= 72 0.023 -0.032 -0.137 
(0.604) (0.583) (0.202) 
Acquirer Stock Performance -0.067b 0.011 -0.024a 
(0.017) (0.373) (0.003) 
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 
r2 0.51 0.17 0.32 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10:  Unaffiliated/Target Director Tenure 
 
The table presents analysis of director tenure for retained target directors and unaffiliated directors on the post-merger board.  There 
are a total of 841 deals with at least one retained target or unaffiliated director (2,548 retained target and unaffiliated directors) on 
the post-merger board.  Panel A reports the percentage of directors that remain 3 years following the merger.  Panel B compares 
characteristics of those directors that remain for at least 3 years to those directors that leave within 3 years following the merger.  
1,344 (588) retained target or unaffiliated directors stay (leave) for (in) more (less) than 3 years, 804 (264) unaffiliated directors 
stay (leave) for (in) more (less) than 3 years, and 540 (324) retained target directors stay (leave) for (in) more (less) than 3 years.  
Panel C reports the percentage of retained target directors that remain 3 years following the merger for the subsamples of deals 
based on above and below median premium and deal complexity (target R&D expenditures) mergers.  Panel D compares 
characteristics of retained target directors that leave within 3 years following the deal in above and below median deal complexity 
(target R&D expenditures) mergers.  All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.  a, b, and c denote statistically significant 
difference in means at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Tenure     
 All Unaffiliated Target Difference 
Tenure >= 3 years 69.6% 75.3% 62.5% 12.8%a 
 
Panel B:  Stay vs. Leave 
 Stay >= 3 years Leave < 3 years  
Outsider 90% 80%a  
Age 57.24 58.30a  
Female 14% 7%a  
Higher Education 59% 46%a  
Financial Expert 7% 5%c  
Hold Outside Directorships 56% 52%  
Outside CEO Experience 24% 26%  
Target Industry Experience 28% 29%  
Merger Experience 42% 43%  
CEO-Merger Experience 18% 15%c  
Connected to CEO 6% 4%  
Audit Committee 31% 25%a  
Compensation Committee 26% 19%a  
Nominating Committee 21% 18%c  
Panel C:  Target Director Tenure 
 High Premium Low Premium Difference 
Tenure >= 3 years 52.0% 64.9% -12.9%b 
 Low Complexity High Complexity Difference 
Tenure > = 3 years 65.0% 55.2% 9.8%a 
Panel D:  Short Tenure Target Director Characteristics 
 Low Complexity High Complexity Difference 
Financial Expert 5% 14% 9%a 
Hold Outside Directorships 56% 64% 8% 
Outside CEO Experience 24% 33% 10%c 
Target Industry Experience 28% 37% 9%c 
Merger Experience 64% 65% 1% 
CEO-Merger Experience 15% 24% 10%b 
 
